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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Defendant was convicted in the District Court for 
assault, a class B misdemeanor, possession of controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, and possession of handgun 
by felon, a third degree felony. In the course of the 
proceeding, he filed a Motion to Suppress which was denied. 
He appeals the denial of his Motion to Suppress and his 
convictions. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this 
appeal under Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
The issues in this case for review on appeal are the 
following: 
1. Whether or not the District Court committed error in 
refusing to grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress for the 
reason that the arrest of Defendant on November 6, 1994, was 
unlawful. The standard of review is the correction of legal 
error, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
2. Whether or not the District Court committed error by 
refusing to grant Defendants Motion to Suppress because of 
the illegality of the seizure by the police of the motor 
vehicle in the possession of Defendant at the time of his 
arrest on November 6, 1994. The standard of review is the 
correction of legal error, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
3. Whether or not the District Court committed legal 
error in refusing to grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
because the inventory search by the police of the motor 
vehicle seized from Defendant at the time of his arrest 
extended further than was reasonable for an inventory of the 
contents of the vehicle. The standard of review is correction 
of a legal error, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
4. Whether or not the District Court committed error in 
admitting into evidence the results of the laboratory tests of 
the controlled substance found in the vehicle. The standard of 
review is correction of legal error, State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774. (Utah Ct. of Appeals). 
-2-
5. Whether or not the District Court committed legal 
error in admitting the handgun into evidence. The standard of 
review is the correction of legal error, State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
6. Whether or not the jury verdict adjudging Defendant 
guilty of the offense of Assault is supported by sufficient 
evidence to overcome a reasonable doubt. The standard of review 
is an-,analysis of the evidence to see if verdict is justified, 
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah, 1987). 
7. Whether or not the jury verdict adjudging Defendant 
guilty of the offense of Possession of Controlled Substance is 
supported by sufficient evidence to overcome a reasonable doubt. 
The standard of review is an analysis of the evidence to see if 
verdict is justified, State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah, 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
1. This is a criminal case in which defendant, Gregory 
Lee Farrow, was charged by five counts in the Information, 
namely: Count 1, Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, 
occurring on October 10, 1994; Count 2, Assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, occurring on October 21, 1994; Assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, occurring on April 14, 1994; Count 4, Possession 
of Controlled Substance (methamphetamine), a third degree 
felony; and Count 5, Possession of Handgun by felon, a third 
degree felony, this and Count 4 occurring on November 6, 1994. 
2. A preliminary examination was held in which Count 1, 
Aggravated Assault, was dismissed for lack of probable cause, 
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but Defendant was held to answer on all of the remaining 
charges. Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking to 
suppress evidence of his arrest, the seizure of the motor 
vehicle which was in his possession at the time of the arrest, 
and the search of the vehicle. A hearing was had and the motion 
was denied in total. A jury trial was held on the two remaining 
class B assaults and the Possession of Controlled Substance 
charges, and a verdict of guilty was returned on the assault 
occurring on April 14, 1994, and the Possession of Controlled 
Substance charge and a verdict of not guilty on the assault 
allegedly occurring on October 21, 1994. The remaining charge 
of Possession of Handgun by Felon was subsequently tried to 
the court and a judgment of guilty was entered. 
3. By reason of the aforementioned convictions, judgment 
and sentence were entered by the District Court. 
Supporting documents for the foregoing factual statements 
are the Bindover Order, Order Denying Motion to Suppress, 
Jury Verdict and Judgment, Sentence and Commitment. 
II. 
1. Defendant and Angalee Farrow were husband and wife 
and they resided in Beaver City, Utah. (Trial Record (T-R) 
P. 46). During the month of April, 1994, Defendant was employed 
as the manager of Tri-Valley Distributing. Angalee was pregnant 
but she and Defendant were temporarily separated because of 
some marital difficulties. Angalee and Defendant's mother came 
to the business where Defendant was employed on April 14, 1994, 
as Angalee wished to discuss some matters with Defendant. 
An argument ensued, mostly about money, and some minor physical 
confrontation took place at the vehicle in which Angalee 
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and the mother had arrived. Angalee testified that Defendant 
struck her but Defendant testified that he did not and that the 
only physical action that took place between them was each 
pulling on a purse to obtain possession of it. The mother did 
not see all that went on. 
2. Between April 14, 1994, and October 21, 1994, the baby 
was born to Angalee and the parties reconciled and resumed 
living together at their apartment in Beaver City, Utah. 
However, on or about October 21, 1994, a dispute arose between 
them and Angalee moved out and began to reside in Cedar City, 
Utah where her parents lived. She spent some time at Defendants 
parents home in Summit, Utah, some time with her parents, 
some time in an apartment and finally went to a shelter home. 
No confrontations or disputes occurred between Defendant and 
Angalee after October 21 when Angalee left the home in Beaver. 
3. On November 5, 1994, Officer Cameron Noel, of the 
Beaver City Police Department, received information concerning 
some alleged domestic problems between Defendant and his wife 
Angalee, and he went to Cedar City and interviewed her. The 
interview centered on three alleged assaults occurring on April 
14, 1994, October 10, 1994, and October 21, 1994. (Preliminary 
Examination Record, Pr-Ex-R, P. 21 and Suppression Hearing 
Record, Sup-R, P. 8). As to the incident occurring on October 
10, 1994, with respect to which the aggravated assault charge 
was lodged but dismissed at the preliminary examination 
(Pr-Ex-R P. 61) the officer was told by Angalee Farrow in 
the interview that Defendant got a pistol in his hand and 
threatened to kill himself but he never pointed the gun at 
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Angalee or threatened to shoot her. (Pr Ex-R P. 8 
Sup-R P. 14). 
4. On the basis of the interview with Angalee Farrow, 
Officer Noel returned to Beaver and informed other officers 
that he wanted to have Defendant arrested for assault. 
On the evening of November 6, 1994, Deputy Sheriff John B. 
Chambers saw Defendant come out of the Beaver Post Office 
on Main Street in Beaver City and approach his vehicle, 
(Sup-R P.32). Relying on Officer Noel's request, Officer 
Chambers detained Defendant just as Defendant was about to 
enter his vehicle, (Sup-R P. 32). Officer Chambers told 
Defendant that he, Defendant, would have to be taken to the 
sheriff's office and that defendant's vehicle would be towed 
to the sheriff's office, (Sup-R P. 34). Defendant was formally 
arrested upon his arrival at the sheriff's office by Officer 
Noel for assault, (Sup-R P. 22). Defendant protested at 
that point and after arriving at the sheriff's office about 
having his vehicle towed to the sheriff's office because it 
was a rental car and he did not want it taken into custody and 
offered to call his assistant manager at the business to come 
and take possession of the vehicle, but the police refused 
to allow him to provide for the car in that manner and had the 
vehicle towed to the sheriff's office over Defendant's objection, 
(Sup-R P. 38 and 39). Officer Chambers testified at the supp-
ression hearing that his department has a policy of taking 
vehicles into custody whenever they are in the immediate 
possession of persons arrested as a protection for the police 
agency and for the vehicle although be did'nt specify any danger 
to the vehicle in this case had it been turned over to some 
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person that Defendant would have designated (Sup-R P. 42). 
5. Officer Chambers and Noel conducted an extensive 
"inventory" search of defendants vehicle. The officer inside 
the vehicle found a folder between the two front bucket seats 
which had the appearance of a folder for the keeping of an 
owners manual, and the officer opened the folder and found 
an owners manual and a small package containing what he 
identified to be methamphetamine,(Pr Ex-R P. 48). The officers 
also found a handgun on the passenger seat of the vehicle, 
(Pr Ex-R P. 48). Defendant had been previously convicted of 
the commission of a felony. 
6. The supposed methamphetamine was later transported to 
Cedar City to a chemistry crime laboratory for testing. The 
substance was left at the laboratory but there was no hand-
to-hand delivery of the substance from the transporting officer 
to any other person, (Tr-R P. 173), There was also a period 
of time when the vehicle of Defendant's was left on the street 
when he was being taken to the sheriff's office and before the 
tow truck arrived when it was not under continuous surveillance, 
(Tr-R P. 168). Defense counsel objected to the test report of 
the substance being received in evidence at the trial as there 
having been an inadequate chain of evidence between the time 
that Defendant was taken from his vehicle and the time that the 
substance was actually received by the lab technician, but the 
trial judge overruled the objection, (Tr-R P# 173). 
7. Defendant testified at the trial that he was not a user 
of methamphetamine, that the vehicle was a rental car from Las 
Vegas, Nevada, and that he had no knowledge of the presence of 
the substance in the vehicle, (Tr-R P. 214-253). 
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SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
I. 
ARREST OF DEFENDANT UNLAWFUL. 
The arrest of Defendant was not lawful because the officer 
did not have reasonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor had 
been committed in the officer!s presence or that a felony had 
been committed by Defendant. The officer was not responding 
to a domestic violence call as anticipated by statute because 
the arrest of Defendant was too remote in time and place from 
any domestic problem actual or known to the officer. 
II. 
SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE UNLAWFUL. 
The seizure of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful because 
the vehicle had no relevance to the cause for the arrest and 
Defendant was able and desirous of providing for the safe 
keeping of the vehicle otherwise thereby relieving the police 
from all risk of liability. 
III. 
SEARCH OF VEHICLE WAS UNREASONABLE AND EXCESSIVE. 
Even if the seizure of the vehicle was lawful, the 
inventory of the contents of the vehicle process was unreason-
able and excessive in that it went so far as to open the 
owners manual cover. 
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IV. 
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE LABORATORY REPORT ON THE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNLAWFUL. 
The admission into evidence of the laboratory report 
on the testing of the controlled substance was unlawful 
because there was not continuous survailance of Defendant's 
vehicle between the time of his arrest and the time of the 
inventory of the vehicle and because there was not an unbroken 
chain of evidence of the possession of the controlled substance 
between the inventory of the vehicle and the testing by the 
technition at the laboratory. 
V. 
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF HANDGUN UNLAWFUL. 
The admission into evidence of the handgun found in 
Defendant's vehicle was unlawful because there was not continuous 
survailance of Defendant's vehicle between the time of his 
arrest and the time of the inventory of the vehicle. 
VI. 
CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 
The jury verdict of assault should be set aside as not being 
supported by the evidence. 
VII. 
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AGAINST WEIGHT 
OF EVIDENCE. 
The jury verdict of possession of controlled substance should 
be set aside as not being supported by the evidence. In view of 
Defendants testimony, there was clearly a reasonable doubt. 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
I. 
ARREST OF DEFENDANT UNLAWFUL. 
The record does not disclose the issuance of a warrant 
for the arrest of Defendant, so the arrest must be sustained, 
if at all, as a warrantless arrest. The claimed justification 
for the arrest was assault. (Sup-R P. 22). There are only 
two possible statutory bases that deserve analysis: 
(1) Section 77-7-2, UCA, 1953, quoted in the Addendum, 
impowers peace officers to affect a warrantless arrest under 
certain circumstances. Sub-Section (1) does not apply as the 
record does not disclose the commission of any misdemeanor 
in the officer's presence. Sub-Section (2) would apply only 
if the officer had reasonable cause to believe that a felony 
had been committed and that defendant had committed it. The 
felony apparently relied on was the alleged aggravated assault 
occurring on October 10, 1994, (which was dismissed at the pre-
liminary examination for lack of probable cause) and the only 
evidence of that which the officer had was obtained from his 
interview with Angelee Farrow on November 5, 1994, and that 
evidence, as testified to by Officer Noel at the suppression 
hearing, was to the effect that Defendant threatened to use 
the gun on himself but did not threaten Angelee Farrow with 
the gun in any manner. (Sup-R P. 14). Sub-Section (3) 
has no application because there was no evidence that Defendant 
was attempting to flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest, or 
that he was going to destroy or conceal evidence, or that he 
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was about to injure any person or damage any property belonging 
to another. He was just stopping his vehicle on Main Street 
to get his mail. (Sup-R P. 32). The record does not disclose 
any contact by Defendant with his wife since October 21, 1994, 
with the alleged aggravated assault occurring on October 10, 
1994, and the arrest was made on November 6, 1994. (Sup-R 
P. 22). 
(2) Section 77-36-2, UCA, 1953, quoted in the Addendum, 
provides officers with additional warrantless arrest powers by 
Sub-Section (3) in domestic violence cases, but the clear 
intent of the statute, as indicated by Sub-Sections (2) and 
(3), is to provide a remedy for immediate and urgent situations 
involving domestic violence. However, Section 77-36-3 is not 
intended to be a substitute for the general arrest powers 
contained in Section 77-7-2 in cases arising out of domestic 
violence but not needing urgent attention. In the instant case, 
at least 16 days had elapsed since the last contact between 
the parties so far as the record indicates and there had been 
more than ample time to procure an arrest warrant. Indeed, 
in view of the continued presence of Defendant in the small 
community and the fact that the alleged victim was residing in 
a shelter for safety in Cedar City, Utah, more than 50 miles 
away, there was ample time to obtain an arrest warrant after 
the interview with the alleged victim on November 5, 1994. 
In view of the foregoing, the arrest of Defendant should 
have been suppressed by reason of the hearing on the Motion to 
Suppress, as well as all evidence obtained as a result of the 
unlawful arrest. 
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II. 
SEIZURE OF DEFENDANTS VEHICLE UNLAWFUL. 
Even if the arrest of Defendant was lawful, the officer 
had no right to seize his vehicle under the circumstances of 
this case. The officer testified at the hearing on the Motion 
to Suppress that the reason for the policy of taking vehicles 
into custody that had been in the possession of a person 
arrested is to protect the vehicle from damage in being left 
unattended thereby eliminating liability to the police and 
loss to the owner of the vehicle. (Sup-R P. 42). It is 
conceeded that such a policy has merit where the arrest is 
made in certain districts of large cities or when there is 
otherwise risk in leaving a vehicle unattended. The liability 
of the police is rooted in the fact that they are taking the 
arrested person away from his vehicle and thereby creating a 
risk of loss to him. In the instant case, Defendant desired 
and urged to assume his own responsibility and also the 
responsibility of the police by delivering the vehicle over to 
a reliable person and thereby avoid the lack of accessability 
to his business of the vehicle and the fees involved in the 
impoundment. (Sup-R P. 42). As the arrest was for assault, 
the vehicle had no relevance and the police did not claim 
that it had any evidenciary value. The objective of the 
police, especially where they searched even to the extent of 
looking into an owners manual, was an obvious pretext for an 
opportunity to search the vehicle but not to protect it. 
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III. 
INVENTORY OF VEHICLE UNREASONABLE AND EXCESSIVE. 
Even if the seizure of the vehicle was lawful and necessary 
for its protection, the inventory of the contents, which the 
officer insisted upon calling it rather than a "search", 
(Sup-R P% 42). extended beyond what was necessary to itemize 
the contents for the protection of the police. The list 
could have included an "owners manual" rather than whatever 
might have been inside the cover. The "inventory" was an 
obvious pretext search, and one might wonder how far the 
"inventory" would have gone had the officers not found what they 
were looking for in the manual. One whose vehicle is taken 
from him upon his arrest is entitled to have the property handled 
with a view of protecting his privacy rather than to exploit 
his belongings to the world. While the vehicle was found to 
contain a prohibited substance, the officers had no right to 
violate Defendant's constitutional right of privacy in order 
to locate something which the officers no doubt had a hunch 
was present. 
IV. 
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF LABORATORY TEST RESULTS OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNLAWFUL. 
At the trial, evidence was offered as to the test results 
on the examination by the chemist of the substance seized from 
Defendant's vehicle in the course of the "inventory". The 
officer testified that he transported the substance to the 
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laboratory in Cedar City, Utah, for analysis where he placed 
it in a locker to be presumably obtained by the chemist who 
would perform the test. (Tr-R P. 112). The evidence was 
incomplete and insufficient as to the laboratory's procedure, 
in any, to control the access to the locker. The trial judge 
stated in the presence of the jury that he believed the 
procedure to be adequate but his belief was apparently from 
sources outside the trial record which the defense had no 
opportunity to evaluate. (Tr-R P. 173). The defense objection 
to admitting the test result should have been sustained and 
the evidence rejected. An additional reason for rejecting the 
test result is that there was a period of time between the 
time that Defendant was arrested and taken from his vehicle 
and the time of the "inventory" when the vehicle was not under 
continuous surveillance thereby allowing an opportunity for 
some other person to place the substance into the vehicle. 
(Tr-R P. 168). 
V. 
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF HANDGUN UNLAWFUL. 
Evidence was presented at the subsequent portion of the 
trial to the court without a jury, (the trial was bifurcated 
in order to avoid the prejudicial effect of having the jury 
learn that Defendant had been previously convicted of a 
felony), that a handgun had been located in Defendant's vehicle 
in connection with the inventory, together with evidence that 
Defendant had been previously convicted of a felony prior to 
his arrest in the instant case. By reason of the lack of 
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continuous surveillance of the vehicle as set forth in the 
preceeding Point ,TIVTf of this argument, the handgun evidence 
should have been excluded. Because of the exclusion of the 
handgun evidence, the evidence of the former conviction of 
a felony would have been irrelevant and should also have been 
excluded. 
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VI. 
CONVICTION OF ASSAULT AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 
The jury!s verdict of guilty of assault, a class B 
Tnisdemeanor, occurring on April 14, 1994, is not supported by 
sufficient evidence to overcome Defendant's presumption of 
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Angelee Farrow 
testified that Defendant struck her, Defendant testified with 
equal believability that he did not strike her which should 
have left a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as 
to his guilt. The anxiety and confusion surrounding the 
incident would have clouded her impressions as much as his. 
(Tr-R P. 50). 
VII. 
CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AGAINST 
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 
One of the essential elements of the offense of posses-
sion of controlled substance is that it be had T!knowingly and 
intentionally". (Section 58-37-8). 
Defendant testified that the vehicle was a rental car 
from Las Vegas, Nevada, and that he had not had occasion to 
look into the owners manual and that he was not aware of the 
presence of the controlled substance. The State had no 
evidence on the point. (Tr-R P.214-25^In view of the lack of 
evidence to the contrary, the jury had no basis for finding 
against Defendant's testimony. The jury was in error in 
assuming, without evidence, that the mere presence in an 
unobvious place in the vehicle of the substance should not 
overcome the reasonable doubt created by his testimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. The ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS entered by the 
District Court should be vacated, and the evidence of the 
arrest of Defendant, together with all evidence resulting from 
his arrest, should be suppressed. 
2. The evidence obtained by reason of the seizure, 
search and inventory of the contents of Defendant's vehicle 
should be suppressed, even if the evidence of the arrest of 
Defendant is not suppressed. 
3. The evidence of the result of the test by the 
chemist of the substance seized from Defendant's vehicle 
should be ruled as inadmissible and suppressed. 
4. The evidence of the handgun found in Defendant's 
vehicle and the evidence of his having been previously 
convicted of a felony should be ruled inadmissible and suppressed. 
5. The conviction of Defendant for assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, should be set aside. 
6. The conviction of Defendant for possession of controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, should be set aside. 
7. The conviction of Defendant for possession of handgun 
by felon, a third degree felony, should be set aside. 
Dated November 13, 1995. 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, S 77-7-2 (1953, as amended) copy attached. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, i 77-36-2 (1953, as amended) copy attached 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, copy attached. 
Order admitting sample of controlled substance (Exhibit 1) 
into evidence. Jury trial record P. 173-175. 
JURY VERDICT. 
Order finding Defendant guilty. Record of hearing held 
April 20, 1995, P. 16. 
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Bf UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-7-6 
Etion 
J-M6. 
-7-17. 
1W9. 
I •7-22. ?7-23. 
Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for 
dangerous weapon — Grounds. 
Authority of peace officer to take possession of 
weapons. 
Citation on misdemeanor or infraction charge. 
Appearance required by citation — Arrest for 
failure to appear — Transfer of cases — Motor 
vehicle violations — Disposition of fines and 
costs. 
Service of citation on defendant — Filing in court 
— Contents of citations. 
Proceeding on citation — Voluntary forfeiture of 
bail — Parent signature required — Informa-
tion, when required. 
Failure to appear as misdemeanor. 
Delivery of prisoner arrested without warrant to 
magistrate — Transfer to court with jurisdic-
tion — Violation as misdemeanor. 
B-7'l. "Arrest" defined — Restraint al lowed. 
|An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or 
pmission to custody. The person shall not be subjected to 
wj more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and 
pention. 1980 
Bj«2. By peace officers. 
B peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
grrant or may, without warrant , arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in 
the presence of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of 
the physical senses or any device that enhances the 
acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or 
records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person 
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable 
^ause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property be-
longing to another person. 1986 
J-7-3. By private persons . 
I private person may arrest another: 
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his 
^presence; or 
(2) When a felony has been committed and he has 
reasonable cause to believe the person arrested has com-
L mitted it. 1980 
f-7-4. Magistrate may orally order arrest. 
|A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to arrest 
'one committing or at tempting to commit a public offense in 
j presence of the magistrate, and, in the case of an emer-
when probable cause exists, a magistrate may orally 
horize a peace officer to arrest a person for a public offense, 
I thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall be 
i against the person arrested. 1980 
Issuance of warrant — Time and place arrests 
may be made — Contents of warrant — Re-
sponsibility for transporting prisoners — 
Court clerk to dispense restitution for trans-
portation. 
|(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon 
lading probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested 
IHU committed a public offense. If the offense charged is: 
(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at 
any time of the day or night; or 
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be 
made at night only if: 
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do 
so on the warrant; 
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a public 
highway, in a public place, or in a place open to or 
accessible to the public; or 
(iii) the person to be arrested is encountered by a 
peace officer in the regular course of that peace 
officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated 
to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest. 
(2) (a) If the magistrate determines that the accused must 
appear in court, the magistrate shall include in the arrest 
warrant the name of the law enforcement agency in the 
county or municipality with jurisdiction over the offense 
charged. 
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the 
magistrate under Subsection (a) is responsible for 
providing inter-county transportation of the defen-
dant, if necessary, from the arresting law enforce-
ment agency to the court site. 
(ii) The law enforcement agency named on the 
warrant may contract with another law enforcement 
agency to have a defendant transported. 
(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the 
magistrate under Subsection (a) as responsible for 
transporting the defendant shall provide to the court 
clerk of the court in which the defendant is tried, an 
affidavit stating that the defendant was transported, 
indicating the law enforcement agency responsible 
for the transportation, and stating the number of 
miles the defendant was transported. 
(ii) The court clerk shall account for restitution 
paid under Section 76-3-201 for governmental trans-
portation expenses and dispense restitution monies 
collected by the court to the law enforcement agency 
responsible for the transportation of a convicted de-
fendant. 1993 
77-7-5.5. Repealed. 1991 
77-7-6. Manner of making arrest. 
(1) The person making the arrest shall inform the person 
being arrested of his intention, cause, and authority to arrest 
him. Such notice shall not be required when: 
(a) there is reason to believe the notice will endanger 
the life or safety of the officer or another person or will 
likely enable the party being arrested to escape; 
(b) the person being arrested is actually engaged in the 
commission of, or an at tempt to commit, an offense; or 
(c) the person being arrested is pursued immediately 
after the commission of an offense or an escape. 
(2) (a) If a hearing-impaired person, as defined in Subsec-
tion 78-24a-l(2), is arrested for an alleged violation of a 
criminal law, including a local ordinance, the arresting 
officer shall assess the communicative abilities of the 
hearing-impaired person and conduct this notification, 
and any further notifications of rights, warnings, interro-
gations, or taking of statements, in a manner that accu-
rately and effectively communicates with the hearing-
impaired person including qualified interpreters, lip 
reading, pen and paper, typewriters, computers with 
print-out capability, and telecommunications devices for 
the deaf. 
(b) Compliance with this subsection is a factor to be 
considered by any court when evaluating whether state-
ments of a hearing-impaired person were made know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 1995 
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UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-36-3 
g state Renunciation of this com-
be by the same authority which exe-
sending a six-month notice in writing 
ion to withdraw from the compact to 
tes party hereto 1980 
CHAPTER 35 
ES OF CRIMINAL P R O C E D U R E 
t oy Laws 1989, ch. 187, § 15.) 
CHAPTER 36 
BEFANT ABUSE P R O C E D U R E S ACT 
Definitions 
Law enforcement officers' training, 
duties, and powers — Reports — 
Records 
Court's powers and duties m domestic 
violence actions — Order restrain-
ing defendant — Penalty for viola-
tion 
Conditions for release after arrest for 
domestic violence 
Repealed 
Appearance of defendant required — 
Determinations by court 
Sentencing — Restricting contact 
with victim — Counseling — Cost 
assessed against defendant 
Enforcement of orders restricting con-
tact with victim 
Prosecutor to notify victim of decision 
as to prosecution 
Peace officers' immunity from liabil-
ity 
Separability clause 
Definitions. 
p n this chapter 
^Cohabitant" has the same meaning as in 
rabo-6-i 
HEDomestic violence" includes any of the fol-
HPcrimes when committed by one cohabitant 
B|fc another 
HuO assault, as described in Section 76-
n b ) aggravated assault, as described in 
Rction 76-5-103, 
•Re) mayhem, as described in Section 76-
Bfd) criminal mischief, as described in Sec-
Ecm 76-6-106, 
R e ) burglary, as described in Section 76-
B(f) aggravated burglary, as described in 
Kction 76-6-203, 
mjg) criminal trespass, as described in Sec-
Eon 76-6-206, 
m(h) aggravated kidnapping, as described 
E*cSection 76-5-302, 
K(i) unlawful detention, as described in Sec-
Eon 76-5-304, or 
B£(j) sexual offenses, as described in Title 
B6, Chapter 5, Par t 4, and Title 76, Chapter 
KErVictim" means a cohabitant who has been 
|ected to domestic violence 1993 
77-36-2. L a w enforcement officers , t r a in ing , du-
ties, a n d p o w e r s — R e p o r t s — 
Reco rds . 
(1) All training relating to the handling of domes-
tic violence complaints by law enforcement officers 
shall stress protection of the victim, enforcement of 
criminal laws in domestic situations, and availability 
of community resources Law enforcement agencies 
and community organizations with expertise in do-
mestic violence shall cooperate in all aspects of that 
training 
(2) The primary duty of peace officers responding 
to a domestic violence call is to protect the parties 
and enforce the laws allegedly violated 
(3) (a) In addition to the arrest powers described in 
Section 77-7-2, when a peace officer responds to a 
domestic violence call and has probable cause to 
believe that a crime has been committed, the 
peace officer shall arrest without a warrant or 
issue a citation to any person that he has proba-
ble cause to believe has committed any of the 
offenses described in Subsections 77-36-l(2)(a) 
through (I) 
If the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that there will be continued violence 
against the alleged victim, or if there is evidence 
that the perpetrator has either recently caused 
serious bodily injury or used a dangerous weapon 
in the domestic violence offense, the officer shall 
arrest and take the alleged perpetrator into cus-
tody, and may not utilize the option of issuing a 
citation under this section For purposes of this 
section "serious bodily injur}" and "dangerous 
weapon" mean the same as those terms are de-
fined in Section 76-1-601 
(b) If a peace officer does not immediately ex-
ercise arrest powers or initiate criminal proceed-
ings by citation or otherwise, he shall notify the 
victim of his or her right to initiate a criminal 
proceeding and of the importance of preserving 
evidence 
(c) A peace officer responding to a domestic vi-
olence call shall prepare an incident report in-
cluding an officer's disposition of the case That 
report shall be made available to the victim, 
upon request, at no cost 
(4) The peace officer shall offer, arrange, or facili-
tate transportation for the victim to a hospital for 
treatment of injuries, or to a place of safety or shelter 
(5) The law enforcement agency shall forward the 
incident report to the appropriate prosecutor within 
ten days of making the report, unless the case is un-
der active investigation 
(6) Each law enforcement agency shall, as soon as 
practicable, make a written record and maintain 
records of all incidents of domestic violence reported 
to it 
(7) Records made and kept pursuant to Subsections 
(3) and (6) shall be identified by a law enforcement 
agency code for domestic violence 1991 
77-36-3. C o u r t s power s a n d du t i e s in domest ic 
violence act ions — O r d e r r e s t r a i n i n g 
de f endan t — Pena l ty for violat ion. 
(1) Because of the serious nature of domestic vio-
lence, the court, m domestic violence actions 
(a) may not dismiss any charge or delay dispo-
sition because of concurrent divorce or other civil 
proceedings, 
(b) may not require proof that either party is 
seeking a dissolution of marriage before instiga-
tion of criminal proceedings, 
-?o-
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JUL 13 199. John 0. Christiansen Attorney for Defendant 
P. 0, Box 1468 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Tel. 801-438-5412 
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY LEE FARROW, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
No. 94-CR-90 
Defendant having filed in this action his Motion to Suppress 
Evidence arising from the arrest of Defendant, the seizure of the 
motor vehicle which was in his possession at the time of the arrest, 
and the inventorying of the contents of said vehicle, all occurring 
on November 6, 1994, and the suppression of all evidence obtained by 
reason of such arrest, seizure and inventorying, and said Motion having 
come on for hearing before the court on the 9th day of March, 
1995, the State being represented by Leo G. Kanell, Beaver County 
Attorney, and the Defendant being present and represented by his 
assigned legal counsle, John 0. Christiansen, and said arrest, 
seizure and inventorying having been done without a warrant, and 
the State having presented evidence and legal argument against the 
granting of said Motion and Defendant having presented legal 
argument in favor of said Motion and the court having duly considered 
the same, and it appearing: 
1. That the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe 
a felony had been committed and had reasonable cause to believe 
that the Defendant had committed it; 
2. That the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe 
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that the Defendant had committed a public offense, and there was 
reasonable cause for believing that the Defendant may have fled to 
avoid arrestybr may injure another person; and 
3, That there was an ongoing threat of domestic violence by 
Defendant against his spouse, Angelee Farrow: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: That said Motion to suppress should 
be and is hereby denied. 
Dated J- & ~ 
Robert"T. Braithvaite'** 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Leo G. Kanell, 
Beaver County Attorney, 
Attorney for State 
C K ^ 1 A & ^ H&x*. 
John 0. Christiansen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing AppellantTs 
Appeal Brief upon the Plaintiff/Respondent by mailing two 
copies thereof, postage prepaid, to the Attorney for the 
Plaintiff/Respondent on the 16th day of November, 1995, addressed 
as follows: Ms. Jan Graham, Attorney General, State of Utah, 
236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
John 0. Christiansen 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
P.O. Box 1468 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
